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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge: 
 
Petitioner Edward Duncan appeals from the order of the 
District Court denying his petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. He argues that the court should have granted the 
writ because trial counsel had a conflict of inter est and was 
otherwise ineffective. He also contends the trial court gave 
an erroneous accomplice charge which infected the entire 
trial. The issues raised and the procedural posture in which 
they reach us can be placed in context following a brief 




Duncan, Anthony Norman, Douglas Sherman, Caldwell 
Moody ("Caldwell"), and Clarence Moody ("Clarence") were 
at the Moody brothers' apartment in Newark, New Jersey 
on February 18, 1989 when Robert Henderson and Norris 
Holmes arrived outside the building and honked the 
automobile horn. Duncan asked Caldwell to go out and 
send Henderson, with whom Norman appar ently had a 
drug-related monetary dispute, up to the apartment. When 
Henderson arrived at the apartment, accompanied by 
Holmes, they sensed a threat and fled, jumping through the 
building's glass door to escape. Duncan and Nor man 
pursued them, holding guns. Shots were fir ed, Henderson 
sustained a hand injury, and Holmes was killed by a single 
bullet shot. Duncan and Norman fled. 
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Duncan was arrested on March 12, 1989. After waiving 
his Miranda rights, he gave a voluntary statement in which 
he admitted that he was present at the Moodys' apartment 
on the night of February 18. He placed the r esponsibility of 
the shooting on Norman, describing the events as follows: 
Norman had identified Henderson as having pr eviously 
robbed him, and when Henderson drove up, accompanied 
by Holmes, Duncan directed Caldwell to get him and told 
Norman not to do anything. However, when Henderson and 
Holmes reached the apartment, Norman jumped at them 
with a gun and chased them down the stairs. Duncan then 
grabbed his gun and followed but the three others were 
already outside when he arrived downstairs and heard two 
gunshots. Norman told Duncan that he had shot Holmes in 
the leg. Seeing Holmes on the ground, Duncan led Norman 
inside and they left through the building's r ear exit. Later, 
Duncan returned the gun to Cully, who had given him the 
gun because Duncan watched over Cully's drug money. 
 
Norman was arrested on March 13, 1989, and he also 
made a voluntary statement. He claimed that both he and 
Duncan collected money for Cully, a drug dealer , and had 
been looking for Henderson on the night of February 18 to 
avenge a robbery. When Henderson and Holmes dr ove up 
outside the apartment, Duncan sent Caldwell to get them. 
Then, Norman stated, both he and Duncan waited for them 
with guns, chased them down the stairs, and shot at them. 
When they saw Holmes injured on the ground, they fled 
through the building's back exit, and Duncan got rid of the 
guns by returning them to Cully who had provided them to 
Duncan. His version did not identify which shooter actually 
killed Holmes. 
 
A. State Court Proceedings 
 
Duncan, Norman, Sherman, and Caldwell were indicted 
for the purposeful or knowing murder of Holmes, 
aggravated assault on Henderson, and two weapon- 
possession offenses. Duncan hired attor ney Richard 
Roberts to represent him, agreeing to pay the lawyer from 
his $25,000 bail. Duncan told Roberts that Nor man also 
needed an attorney, and Roberts recommended Michael 
Pedicini. Although Roberts and Pedicini (and two other 
lawyers) shared office space at the time, they were not 
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officially partners and each had his own secr etary, phone, 
and trust and expense accounts. When Norman r etained 
Pedicini, the two attorneys agreed to split Duncan's bail 
money evenly. 
 
The trial court severed the defendants' cases for trial. 
Norman was tried from February 14 to 16, 1990, 
represented by Pedicini, and was convicted of Holmes' 
murder, aggravated assault on Henderson, and the two 
counts of gun possession. On April 23, 1990, Duncan went 
to trial represented by Roberts, who intr oduced himself to 
the jury as "Richard M. Roberts, from the firm of Roberts, 
Pedicini and Fielo." 1T at 43. 
 
At Duncan's trial, the prosecution called five witnesses, 
none of whom testified to witnessing the shooting. 
Clarence, the only witness present when Holmes was killed, 
recounted a confrontation between Nor man and Henderson 
hours before Holmes' death and detailed the events in the 
Moody apartment before and after the shooting. Clarence's 
testimony portrayed Duncan as having a certain amount of 
authority over the group at the apartment. For example, he 
stated that Duncan had sent Norman to summon the 
Moody brothers back to their apartment after Norman's 
confrontation with Henderson, instructed Caldwell to bring 
Henderson up to the apartment after Norman identified 
Henderson for Duncan, and told Sherman to get out guns 
while waiting for Henderson to arrive. Clarence also 
testified that Duncan took a gun himself, gave a gun to 
Norman, hid behind the apartment door, confronted 
Henderson when he arrived, and, with Norman, chased 
Henderson and Holmes. 
 
Detective Jack Eutsey, who had interviewed Duncan after 
his arrest, described the encounter and r ead Duncan's 
statement to the jury. Dr. Phito Pierr e-Louis, the forensic 
pathologist who had performed Holmes' autopsy, described 
the cause of death (internal bleeding fr om a single gunshot 
wound). Officer Robert Purcell, who had r esponded to the 
shooting, described the scene and identified two bullets 
found there. Finally, Detective Frank Racioppi, the county 
investigator, detailed his efforts tofind Henderson, a 
subpoenaed witness who failed to appear at the trial. After 
the State's case, the trial judge dismissed the assault 
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charge because the State had not met its bur den of proof, 
but denied Roberts' motion for acquittal of the mur der 
charge. 
 
Although Duncan's statement was admitted into evidence 
and read as part of Detective Eutsey's testimony, Duncan 
himself did not testify at trial. Nor did Roberts call any 
witnesses on behalf of the defense. In his closing, Roberts 
acknowledged that Duncan possessed a gun on the night in 
question and told the jury it should retur n a guilty verdict 
as to gun possession, but kept emphasizing that the State 
had not met its burden of proof on the other charges. He 
attacked Clarence's credibility, and ur ged the jury to acquit 
Duncan of the murder charge. The pr osecutor, in turn, 
conceded he did not know whether Duncan or Nor man had 
fired the fatal shot, but insisted that Clar ence's testimony 
was credible, asserted that Duncan was guilty of purposeful 
murder either as a principal or as an accomplice, and 
emphasized that Duncan had orchestrated the incident that 
culminated in Holmes' death. 
 
In charging the jury, the court gave detailed instructions 
on the murder and weapons counts, and on the lesser 
included offenses of aggravated and reckless manslaughter. 
The court also described the doctrine of transferr ed intent 
and gave a lengthy instruction on accomplice liability. 
During deliberations, the jury asked the court to"explain 
the definition [sic] between murder and aggravated 
manslaughter" and to "explain guilty by association." 4T at 
2. In response, the court again read the murder, aggravated 
manslaughter, and accomplice liability char ges to the jury. 
The jury found Duncan guilty of murder and the weapon- 
possession offenses. On May 15, 1990, the court sentenced 
Duncan to a lengthy prison term1  for the murder, imposed 
a concurrent four-year sentence for thefirst gun- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The government states in its brief, and the Appellate Division stated 
in 
its opinion affirming Duncan's conviction, that Duncan was sentenced to 
life in prison with 30 years of parole ineligibility for Holmes' murder. 
The 
sentencing hearing transcript and the sentencing for m appear, however, 
to impose a thirty-year sentence, as Duncan states in his brief. We do 
not attempt to resolve the differ ence as it does not bear on the issue 
before us. 
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possession offense but vacated the second gun-possession 
verdict as having merged with the mur der conviction. 
 
Roberts, by then officially Pedicini's partner , filed an 
appeal of Duncan's conviction with the Appellate Division of 
the Superior Court of New Jersey ("Appellate Division"), 
challenging only the trial court's substitution of a 
deliberating juror and its admission of Duncan's allegedly 
involuntary statement. On July 12, 1991, in an 
unpublished per curiam opinion, the Appellate Division 
affirmed Duncan's conviction. Thereafter, Roberts ceased 
his representation of Duncan. The Supr eme Court of New 
Jersey denied Duncan's petition for certification on 
September 24, 1992. In a separate proceeding, Norman's 
conviction was also affirmed by the Appellate Division, and 
his petition for certification was denied. 
 
B. State Court Collateral Proceedings  
 
On May 11, 1993, Duncan filed a pro se  post-conviction 
relief ("PCR") petition. Attorney Connie Bentley McGhee 
filed a supplemental letter brief in support of the petition 
on January 6, 1995, and represented Duncan at his PCR 
hearing on January 25, 1995. The primary bases of 
Duncan's petition were ineffective assistance of counsel and 
his attorney's conflict of interest. Duncan, Roberts, and 
Alvin Norman ("Alvin"), Norman's brother, all testified at the 
hearing. 
 
Roberts stated that he was a sole practitioner when 
Duncan hired him and during Duncan's trial. However, he 
acknowledged that he had entered into a partnership with 
Pedicini by the time he began preparing Duncan's appeal. 
As to fees, he testified that his division of Duncan's bail 
with Pedicini was not contingent on either attor ney's 
performance. Roberts also claimed he had made a full 
disclosure to Duncan regarding his impending partnership 
and that Duncan had not objected to it, although Roberts 
conceded that he had not obtained a written or on-the- 
record waiver of conflict from Duncan. 
 
As to his trial strategy, Roberts said that it was to portray 
Norman as the killer, stated that Pedicini never asked him 
to alter his defense of Duncan, and asserted that he did not 
change his tactics to benefit himself, Pedicini, or Norman. 
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Roberts acknowledged that he had considered calling as a 
witness Alvin Norman, who had heard Nor man confess to 
shooting Holmes. Roberts explained that he decided not to 
call Alvin because he believed Alvin's testimony constituted 
inadmissible hearsay and because Alvin could put an Uzi in 
Duncan's hands at the scene. Even after Duncan's PCR 
lawyer pointed out that Roberts had conceded at trial that 
Duncan had a gun, Roberts maintained that his judgment 
at the time of trial was that Alvin's testimony would be 
more hurtful than helpful to Duncan's case. 
 
Alvin then testified, and stated that although he had not 
been present when Holmes was shot, both Nor man and 
Duncan had told him about the incident shortly ther eafter. 
Alvin reportedly learned from Nor man that Duncan had 
hidden behind the apartment door with a gun, but that 
Norman had shot Holmes. Duncan, on the other hand, told 
Alvin that he had been talking to Henderson and Holmes 
when Norman burst out from behind the door and chased 
the two down the stairs, and then Duncan had decided to 
follow them. Alvin asserted that he passed his infor mation 
on to Roberts because he wanted to set the r ecord straight 
when Norman did not tell the truth. Alvin stated that he 
was subpoenaed as a witness and sat in the hall during 
Duncan's trial, expecting to testify, but that Roberts 
eventually decided not to use him, telling him that he 
would not be a credible witness because the jury would 
think that Duncan had put him up to testifying. 
 
Duncan then testified at the PCR hearing, and disavowed 
any intent to kill either Henderson or Holmes. He r eported 
that Roberts had initially stated that Alvin would be "vital 
to [his] defense," 6T at 54, but infor med him later that 
Alvin's testimony was not necessary. Duncan also asserted 
that he had asked Roberts to call Douglas Sher man as a 
witness but did not recall why Roberts failed to do so. He 
denied any knowledge of Roberts' and Pedicini's fee 
agreement but claimed that he had no pr oblem with some 
of his bail being used to pay Norman's lawyer and that he 
had intended for any of the money left over after his own 
defense to be used for this purpose. Duncan insisted he 
had no knowledge of the attorneys' partnership until seeing 
Roberts' affiliation on his appeal brief. 
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The trial court denied Duncan's PCR petition on January 
26, 1995. The court concluded there was no actual conflict 
because it credited Roberts' testimony and found that 
Pedicini and Roberts had not become partners until after 
Duncan's trial. The Appellate Division reversed. In an 
unpublished per curiam opinion, it held that Roberts had 
been, or had held himself out to be, Pedicini's partner at 
the time of Duncan's trial, and also found Roberts' reasons 
for failing to call Alvin as a witness were"not supportable." 
App. Div. Op. at 7. While the court acknowledged that 
Roberts may have declined to use Alvin's testimony 
pursuant to some reasonable strategy, it held that it was 
constrained by New Jersey Supreme Court pr ecedent to 
"resolve all doubts in favor of giving [Duncan] a new trial." 
Id. at 8. However, a differ ent panel of the Appellate Division 
affirmed the denial of Norman's PCR petition, finding that 
Pedicini was not Roberts' partner and had no conflict of 
interest at the time of Norman's trial. 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted (and 
consolidated its consideration of) the State's petition for 
certification regarding the reversal of Duncan's conviction, 
Duncan's cross-petition, Norman's petition concerning the 
denial of PCR relief in his case, and the New Jersey Public 
Defender's motion to enter the case as amicus curiae. On 
July 8, 1997, the Court reversed the Appellate Division's 
judgments in both Duncan's and Norman's cases. See State 
v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5, 697 A.2d 511 (1997).2 
 
The Court noted that its rulings provide for br oader 
protection against conflicts of inter est as a matter of New 
Jersey constitutional law than is provided under the federal 
constitution. Under the New Jersey constitution, a per se 
conflict arises if a private attorney, or one associated with 
that attorney, is involved in simultaneous dual 
representations of co-defendants; pr ejudice will be 
presumed unless there has been a valid waiver. Absent 
such joint representation, defendant must show "a great 
likelihood of prejudice" to establish constitutionally 
defective representation. Id. at 25, 697 A.2d at 520. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. With respect to Norman, the Court found Duncan's payment of 
Pedicini's fees created a conflict of inter est for Norman's attorney, and 
ordered a new trial. 
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The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the trial court 
finding that Pedicini and Roberts were not partners prior to 
or during the respective trials of Norman and Duncan was 
supported by substantial credible evidence and was entitled 
to deference. The Court noted that Roberts had represented 
Norman at his arraignment only because Pedicini was 
trying a case in federal court, but stated that Nor man's 
arraignment was pro forma, lasted no more than a minute 
or two, and involved no discussion of the case other than 
an acknowledgment that Norman received a copy of the 
indictment and discovery, waiver of reading of the 
indictment, and entry of a plea of not guilty. The Court held 
that Roberts was merely filling in at the arraignment and 
did not engage in the type of representation of Norman that 
gives rise to a per se conflict. See id. at 27-28, 697 A.2d at 
522. 
 
The Court also held it would not expand its per se 
conflict rule to cases where attorneys represent co- 
defendants while the attorneys are conducting partnership 
negotiations. See id. at 29, 697 A.2d at 522-23. The Court 
then found that Roberts' representation of Duncan was not 
impaired by either a potential or an actual conflict of 
interest that prejudiced Duncan. The Court further held 
that because Duncan failed to object to the trial court's jury 
instructions at trial or on direct appeal, he could only 
challenge them in the context of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. It then found that Roberts' failur e to object 
to the erroneous accomplice-liability instruction was not 
unreasonable and did not prejudice Duncan's trial. It 
remanded the case to the Appellate Division for 
consideration of Duncan's remaining inef fective assistance 
of counsel claims. 
 
On remand, the Appellate Division consider ed and 
rejected Duncan's remaining claims. Duncan again 
petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for certification, 
which the Court denied on May 21, 1998. See State v. 
Duncan, 154 N.J. 608, 713 A.2d 499 (1998). 
 
C. Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings  
 
Duncan petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
District of New Jersey on August 10, 1998, which the 
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District Court denied. The court did not certify it for appeal. 
After Duncan filed a timely Notice of Appeal, this court 
granted a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 2253(c)(1) with respect to his claims that: (1) his right to 
counsel was violated by a conflict of inter est; (2) counsel 
was ineffective for failing to call or interview witnesses 
favorable to the defense; (3) the accomplice liability and 
transferred intent jury instructions wer e erroneous; and (4) 





The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 
28 U.S.C. S 2254 and this court has appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 and 2253. This court applies a 
plenary standard of review when a district court dismisses 
a habeas petition based on a review of the state court 
record and does not hold an evidentiary hearing, as in this 
case. See Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, as amended by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA"), federal courts must give considerable deference 
to the determinations of state courts. Section 2254(d) 
precludes federal habeas relief as to: 
 
       any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State 
       court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim 
       -- 
 
       (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
       involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
       established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
       Court of the United States; or 
 
       (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 
       unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
       evidence presented in the State court pr oceeding. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The State requested that this court r econsider the propriety of a 
certificate of appealability, and asked that we summarily dismiss 
Duncan's appeal. Given the serious nature of Duncan's crime, sentence, 
and constitutional claims, we decline to do so. 
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The Supreme Court has interpreted this standard as 
follows: 
 
       Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court 
       may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a 
       conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a 
       question of law or if the state court decides a case 
       differently than this Court has on a set of materially 
       indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable 
       application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant 
       the writ if the state court identifies the corr ect 
       governing legal principle from this Court's decisions 
       but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of 
       the prisoner's case. 
 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). The Court 
further explained that whether a state court's application of 
federal law is "unreasonable" is judged objectively and that 
an application may be incorrect but still not unreasonable. 
Id. at 409-10. 
 
In conducting a habeas analysis, we must affor d state 
courts' factual findings a presumption of correctness, which 
the petitioner can overcome only by clear and convincing 
evidence. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(1). This presumption 
applies to the factual determinations of both state trial and 
appellate courts. See Dickerson v. Vaughn , 90 F.3d 87, 90 




A. Conflict of interest 
 
Duncan argues that Roberts' actual conflict of interest 
was evidenced by the facts that the attorney: (1) appeared 
at Norman's arraignment, (2) introduced himself at trial as 
Pedicini's partner, (3) split Duncan's bail money with 
Pedicini as each attorney's fee for repr esenting Duncan and 
Norman, (4) failed to call a key witness in Duncan's 
defense, and (5) continued to represent Duncan on appeal 
after the finalization of his partnership with Pedicini. 
Duncan contends that this conflict deprived him of his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and prejudiced his 
defense. He also asserts that the trial court err ed in failing 
to conduct a conflict inquiry. 
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1. Actual Conflict 
 
The determination whether an attorney engaged in 
multiple representation is a mixed question of law and fact 
and therefore not subject to the pr esumption of 
correctness. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-42 
(1980). However, we can only grant Duncan's habeas 
petition if we find that the New Jersey courts' determination 
in this case is contrary to or constitutes an unr easonable 
application of, governing Supreme Court precedent. See 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 399. Because he raised no conflict 
objection at trial, Duncan "must demonstrate that an 
actual conflict of interest adversely af fected his lawyer's 
performance" to prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim. 
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348. 
 
Actual conflict is more likely to occur in cases of joint 
representation (of co-defendants at the same trial) than in 
cases of multiple representation (of co-defendants at 
separate trials). See United States v. Mor elli, 169 F.3d 798, 
810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 820 (1999); see also 
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784 (1987) ("[A]s we noted 
in Cuyler, the provision of separate murder trials for the 
three coindictees `significantly r educed the potential for a 
divergence in their interests.' "). Actual conflict is also more 
easily established when the attorney has taken a positive 
step benefitting another client than when the attorney was 
passive and failed to act on behalf of the petitioner. See 
Morelli, 169 F.3d at 810 (citing United States v. Gambino, 
864 F.2d 1064, 1070 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
 
This case presents at most a case of multiple 
representation, and Duncan cites only passive lapses in 
representation by Roberts, not positive acts. Therefore, to 
establish a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, Duncan must: 
 
       "[f]irst . . . demonstrate that some plausible alternative 
       defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued. He 
       need not show that the defense would necessarily have 
       been successful if it had been used, but that it 
       possessed sufficient substance to be a viable 
       alternative. Second, he must establish that the 
       alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or 
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       not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties or 
       interests." 
 
Id. (quoting Gambino, 864 F.2d at 1070). 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court found no multiple 
representation in this case, either by Roberts individually or 
through his association with Pedicini. Regar ding Norman's 
arraignment, the Court noted that Roberts clearly stated he 
was temporarily filling in for Pedicini, Nor man's counsel, 
who could not attend due to a federal court appearance, 
and he entered Norman's not-guilty plea. Given Roberts' 
minimal role and the fact that Norman's arraignment did 
not last more than a couple minutes or entail any exchange 
of confidential information, the Court found Roberts had 
not "represented" Norman. See Norman, 151 N.J. at 27-28, 
697 A.2d at 521-22. 
 
Duncan argues that arraignments may involve 
confidential exchanges of information when defendants and 
their lawyers determine pleas and possible defenses and 
request bail, but he does not challenge the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's factual description of Nor man's 
arraignment or provide any evidence that it entailed any 
confidential communications. Instead, Duncan ar gues that 
the Court's characterization of Roberts' appearance as a 
mere formality was an unreasonable application of 
Supreme Court precedent because arraignments are a 
crucial part of criminal cases, citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 
U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972). The Kirby Court did describe the 
time from a defendant's arraignment to the beginning of his 
trial as "perhaps the most critical period of the 
proceedings," id. at 688 n.6 (quotation omitted), and noted 
that "[t]he initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far 
from a mere formalism," id.  at 689. However, the context of 
these statements was an opinion holding that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel does not attach until 
adversary judicial proceedings are initiated against a 
defendant. See id. at 688. Kirby does not preclude, or 
render unreasonable, the New Jersey Supr eme Court's 
conclusion that Roberts' appearance at the arraignment did 
not constitute a "representation" of Norman for purposes of 
an analysis under Cuyler. 
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As to the attorneys' fee agreement, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that Pedicini's compensation from 
Duncan's bail money created a conflict for Pedicini, with a 
significant likelihood of prejudice to Nor man, but no 
corresponding risk of prejudice to Duncan. See Norman, 
151 N.J. at 34-36, 697 A.2d at 525-26. The Court further 
noted that because Pedicini no longer repr esented Norman 
at the time he joined the partnership, Roberts' subsequent 
representation of Duncan on direct appeal merely 
constituted "successive" representation. Although the Court 
acknowledged Roberts' self-introduction as Pedicini's 
partner at Duncan's trial, it deferred to the PCR court's 
finding that the attorneys' partnership was not official until 
May 1, 1990, after the trial, and it held that substantial 
credible evidence (both attorneys' testimony and 
corroborating documentary evidence) supported this 
finding. See id. at 27-28, 697 A.2d at 521-22. 
 
The finding that the attorneys were not technically 
partners during Duncan's trial is both well-supported and 
subject to a presumption of correctness. The determination 
that they were not "partners" for the purposes of multiple 
representation is not an unreasonable one. In fact, we have 
found lawyers with similarly entwined, but not officially 
combined, practices not to be "associated" within the 
meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedur e 44(c). See 
United States v. Pungitore, 910 F .2d 1084, 1139-40 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347, for the proposition 
that a court may reasonably rely on attor neys' own 
description of the nature and extent of their professional 
associations). 
 
Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that even if 
Roberts' decision not to call Alvin Norman as a witness was 
motivated by a conflict of interest, 
 
       Alvin's testimony would not have affected the 
       overwhelming evidence that . . . Duncan . . . was at 
       least an accomplice to the murder. . . .[It] simply 
       would have suggested that it was Norman and not 
       Duncan who actually hit Holmes. Whose shot felled 
       Holmes, however, was not dispositive of the murder 
       charge if Duncan, as all of the credible evidence 
       indicated, shared the murderous intent. 
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Norman, 151 N.J. at 32, 697 A.2d at 524. The Court also 
pointed out that if Alvin had testified regar ding Norman's 
out-of-court statement, the State could have intr oduced 
into evidence Norman's statement to the police, which 
further implicated Duncan as an accomplice. 
 
In fact, Duncan has not shown that the use of Alvin's 
testimony constituted a viable alternate defense strategy. 
He argues that Alvin's testimony would have lent his own 
account of the shooting more credibility and that if the jury 
had heard evidence that Duncan did not fir e the fatal shot, 
"it may have analyzed his other conduct in a less culpable 
light, such that he did not share his co-defendant's 
murderous intent." Br. for Appellant at 36. However, the 
identity of the actual shooter is not particularly r elevant to 
Duncan's liability, given the State's reliance on the 
accomplice theory of liability. 
 
Nothing in Alvin's proposed second-hand testimony 
contradicted Clarence's first-hand account, or the evidence 
tending to show Duncan's complicity in the shooting. Nor 
would it have provided a basis for distinguishing Duncan's 
state-of-mind from Norman's at the time of the shooting. 
Even Alvin would have placed Duncan waiting for 
Henderson with a gun in the Moody apartment, possibly 
hidden behind the door. Moreover , as noted by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, the use of Alvin's testimony would 
have rendered admissible Norman's potentially damaging 
statement to the police. Norman, 151 N.J. at 33, 697 A.2d 
at 524. 
 
Duncan has also failed to provide any evidence that 
Roberts' decision not to call Alvin was undertaken due to 
the attorney's other loyalties, or even that Roberts had 
other relevant loyalties. The facts that Roberts erroneously 
believed that Alvin's testimony would have been 
inadmissible hearsay and that Roberts had no r eason to be 
concerned that Alvin's testimony would have shown 
Duncan had a gun do not prove that Roberts' motives were 
tainted by conflict. On the contrary, ther e is no reason to 
reject the state courts' characterization of his decision as a 
strategic one. This is particularly plausible inasmuch as 
Alvin's testimony was at least as likely to have hurt 
Duncan's case by corroborating his complicity in the 
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shooting as to have helped it by identifying Nor man as the 
shooter. 
 
For the above stated reasons, we cannot find that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court's determination in this case is 
contrary to, or that its careful analysis constitutes an 
unreasonable application of, governing United States 
Supreme Court precedent. 
 
2. Conflict Inquiry 
 
Duncan argues that the trial court err ed in failing to 
conduct a sua sponte hearing into Roberts' apparent 
conflict of interest when the attorney introduced himself at 
Duncan's trial as Pedicini's partner. Duncan cites Cuyler, 
446 U.S. at 347, for the proposition that a trial court must 
make such an inquiry if it knows or reasonably suspects 
that a conflict of interest exists. The r elevant quotation 
from the Cuyler opinion makes clear that no such sua 
sponte inquiry was called for in this case: 
 
       Holloway requires state trial courts to investigate 
       timely objections to multiple representation. But 
       nothing in our precedents suggests that the Sixth 
       Amendment requires state courts themselves to initiate 
       inquiries into the propriety of multiple r epresentation 
       in every case. Defense counsel have an ethical 
       obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to 
       advise the court promptly when a conflict of interest 
       arises during the course of trial. Absent special 
       circumstances, therefore, trial courts may assume 
       either that multiple representation entails no conflict or 
       that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such 
       risk of conflict as may exist. Indeed, . . . trial courts 
       necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith 
       and good judgment of defense counsel. . . . Unless the 
       trial court knows or reasonably should know that a 
       particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an 
       inquiry. 
 
446 U.S. at 346-47 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 
In Cuyler, the Court found nothing to indicate the trial 
court had a duty to inquire into potential conflicts of 
interest where the co-defendants' trials were severed; no 
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participant in the petitioner's trial made any objection to 
the multiple representation; and the attor ney's outline of 
his defense strategy both appeared "compatible with the 
view that none of the defendants was connected with the 
[crime]" and suggested that the petitioner's attorney was 
not afraid to call witnesses whom he might need in later 
trials (although the attorney ultimately made a strategic 
decision to rest on the government's case). Id. at 347-48. 
 
Roberts' and Pedicini's association was much mor e 
tenuous than that of the lawyers in Cuyler who worked 
together on three co-defendants' cases. Her e, Pedicini never 
appeared at Duncan's trial or vice versa , and the only 
evidence linking Roberts and Pedicini was Roberts' single 
statement of law-firm affiliation. Duncan has not shown 
that Roberts' written submissions to the trial court 
indicated this affiliation or that any other evidence before 
the court would have pointed to it. 
 
Therefore, Duncan's trial judge may not have suspected 
any multiple representation in Duncan's case, much less 
the type of special circumstances that would trigger a 
conflict inquiry into an otherwise presumptively permissible 
multiple representation. Moreover , the trial court had every 
reason to believe Roberts intended to pursue Duncan's 
defense zealously. For example, Roberts had identified Alvin 
as a witness and subpoenaed him, even though he decided 
not to call him. It follows that there was no basis for the 
trial court to initiate an inquiry into the possibility of a 
conflict of interest on Roberts' part. 
 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel  
 
Duncan argues Roberts' representation of him was 
ineffective because the attorney failed to call Alvin as a 
defense witness at trial, declined to interview Douglas 
Sherman or call him as a witness, and failed to object to 
the trial court's defective jury instructions. In or der to show 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must 
establish both that his counsel's perfor mance was deficient 
and that the deficient performance pr ejudiced his trial to 
the extent that it undermined confidence in the trial's 
outcome. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). The standard by which we judge deficient 
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performance is an objective standar d of reasonableness, 
viewed to the extent possible from the attor ney's 
perspective at the time, without "the distorting effects of 
hindsight." Id. at 688-90. "[B]oth the performance and 
prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are 
mixed questions of law and fact," id., at 698, so this court 
applies a plenary standard of review, see Hess v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 135 F.3d 905, 907 (3d Cir . 1998). 
 
1. Failure to Call Alvin Norman  
 
Duncan's principal ineffectiveness claim r elates to 
Roberts' failure to call Alvin as a witness, an issue we have 
already discussed. The Appellate Division, on r emand from 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, rejected this claim based 
on that court's finding, in the context of its conflict 
analysis, that the failure to call Alvin did not prejudice 
Duncan's defense. Roberts interviewed Alvin and 
considered using his testimony, but ultimately decided not 
to call him as a witness. Given our acceptance of the 
finding that the use of Alvin's testimony would have been 
more harmful than helpful to Duncan's defense, we cannot 
find Roberts' failure to call Alvin was an unreasonable lapse 
amounting to constitutionally deficient per formance. 
 
Rather, the failure to use Alvin's testimony amounted to 
a tactical decision within the parameters of r easonable 
professional judgment. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 
("[s]trategic choices made after thor ough investigation of 
law and facts relevant to plausible options ar e virtually 
unchallengeable."); Sistrunk v. Vaughn , 96 F.3d 666, 670 
(3d Cir. 1996) ("[I]n a criminal defense, certain litigation 
decisions are considered `fundamental' and are for the 
client to make. . . . [A]ll other decisions fall within the 
professional responsibility of counsel."). Because we find 
that Roberts' failure to call Alvin did not rise to the level of 
deficient performance, we cannot find that the Appellate 
Division's rejection of Duncan's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim based on this failure was an unr easonable 
application of Strickland. 
 
                                18 
  
2. Failure to Interview (or Call as a Witness) Douglas 
       Sherman 
 
The Appellate Division rejected Duncan's contention that 
Roberts' failure to interview or call Sher man as a witness 
was an unreasonable lapse and prejudiced his trial. Under 
Strickland, "a particular decision not to investigate must be 
directly assessed for reasonableness in all the 
circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to 
counsel's judgments." 466 U.S. at 691. However , even 
assuming that Roberts' failure to investigate Sherman's 
potential testimony rose to the level of deficient performance,4 
we cannot find the Appellate Division's application of 
Strickland unreasonable because Duncan has not shown 
any prejudice stemming from Roberts' lapse. 
 
First, Duncan has not shown that Sherman would have 
consented to testify at his trial. Sherman, as the Appellate 
Division noted, was to be tried after Duncan for Holmes' 
shooting, was represented by counsel, and would have 
risked self-incrimination had he testified. Mor eover, Duncan 
did not provide any sworn statement fr om Sherman in 
support of his PCR petition. His only evidence r egarding the 
content of Sherman's potential testimony is an unsworn 
letter Sherman wrote to Duncan fr om jail in November 
1990, well after the completion of Duncan's trial. 
 
Sherman's letter suggests that Norman had admitted 
firing the fatal shot and then implicated Duncan. There 
was, however, no evidence offer ed at Duncan's trial that 
Norman had implicated Duncan in the Holmes shooting. 
Historically, the opposite occurred; in Duncan's statement 
to the police, he admitted his involvement in the incident 
and implicated Norman. 
 
Duncan asks this court to speculate both as to whether 
Sherman would in fact have testified on his behalf and as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It is difficult to assess Roberts' decision not to investigate 
Sherman's 
potential testimony, because there does not appear to be any evidence 
concerning it in the record. Ther e is only Duncan's PCR testimony that 
he told Roberts about Sherman and asked Roberts to call Sherman as 
a witness, but that he did not know whether or not Roberts talked to 
Sherman or why Roberts did not call Sher man as a witness. 
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to what Sherman's testimony would have been. A habeas 
petitioner 
 
       must establish a reasonable probability--one sufficient 
       to undermine our confidence in the outcome--that the 
       jury's verdict would have been differ ent if not for 
       counsel's errors. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 
       S. Ct. at 2068. Such a showing may not be based on 
       mere speculation about what the witnesses [his 
       attorney] failed to locate might have said.. . . Under 
       usual circumstances, we would expect that . . . 
       information [obtainable through an adequate 
       investigation] would be presented to the habeas court 
       through the testimony of the potential witnesses. 
 
United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 712 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(quotations omitted). In light of Duncan's failur e to present 
any sworn testimony by Sherman, he has failed to establish 
prejudice as a result of Roberts' alleged failure to interview 
Sherman. 
 
3. Failure to Object to Defective Jury Instructions 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court found that "[t]here is no 
question that the jury charge delivered by the trial court 
was deficient." Norman, 151 N.J. at 37, 697 A.2d at 526.5 
It cited State v. Bielkiewicz, 267 N.J. Super. 520, 632 A.2d 
277 (1993), for the proposition that an accomplice-liability 
charge "must include an instruction that a defendant can 
be found guilty as an accomplice of a lesser included 
offense even though the principal is found guilty of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Court analyzed only the trial court's accomplice-liability 
instructions. It did not discuss Duncan's challenge to the transferred- 
intent instruction and the Appellate Division disposed of the issue 
summarily on remand, based on the Court's pr ejudice analysis of the 
accomplice-liability instruction. The Appellate Division never stated 
whether the transferred-intent instruction was in fact erroneous. Before 
this court, neither the State nor Duncan's attor ney addresses the 
substance of the transferred-intent instruction claims. In his own brief, 
Duncan challenges the instruction but asserts only that it "would have 
prevented the jury from considering whether Petitioner was guilty of 
manslaughter, and not murder." Pro Se Br. for Petitionerat 16. Because 
our review of the instruction does not r eveal why it would have had this 
effect, we reject Duncan's challenges to the instruction as meritless. 
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more serious offense." Nor man, 151 N.J. at 37, 697 A.2d at 
526. It found this requirement was violated by the trial 
court's instructions that "[a] person is an accomplice of 
another person in the commission of an offense if with the 
purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the 
offense he solicits such other person to commit it or he aids 
or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning 
or committing it" and that the defendant "must have shared 
the same intent, the same purpose requir ed to be proved of 
the person who actually committed the crime." Id. 
Nonetheless, the Court held that Roberts' failur e to object 
to the defective charge did not either rise to the level of 
deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland, 
given the substantial deference mandated by that case, or 
create the magnitude of prejudice r equired under the 
second prong of Strickland. See Nor man, 151 N.J. at 38-39, 
697 A.2d at 527. 
 
Again, we cannot find that the New Jersey Supr eme 
Court's determination was an unreasonable application of 
United States Supreme Court precedent. In addition to the 
broad deference generally accorded to attorneys' decisions 
under Strickland, we note that "in making litigation 
decisions, there is no general duty on the part of defense 
counsel to anticipate changes in the law." Sistrunk, 96 F.3d 
at 670 (quotation omitted). Therefore, Roberts' failure to 
object does not rise to the level of deficient per formance 
under Strickland unless the accomplice-liability instruction 
was clearly incorrect when given. 
 
As the State points out, Bielkiewicz, the sole case the 
New Jersey Supreme Court cited in finding the trial court's 
accomplice-liability instruction defective, was decided after 
Duncan's 1990 trial. Although Bielkiewicz r elied on 
principles established in a series of pre-1990 New Jersey 
Supreme Court cases, see 267 N.J. Super . at 527-30, 632 
A.2d at 281-82, application of these principles to 
accomplice-liability instructions in cases involving murder 
and manslaughter had not yet been clearly established at 
the time of Duncan's trial. Accordingly, the New Jersey 
court's determination that Roberts' failur e to object to the 
defective charge did not rise to the level of Strickland 
ineffectiveness is not an unreasonable application of 
Supreme Court precedent. 
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C. Due Process Challenge to Jury Instructions 
 
Duncan contends that the trial court's defective 
accomplice-liability instruction deprived him of due process.6 
More specifically, he argues that the instruction "created 
the mis[-]impression that, if the jury found the principal 
guilty of murder, they also had to convict the accomplice of 
murder," Br. for Appellant at 41-42, and effectively 
withdrew the lesser manslaughter charges from the jury's 
consideration. 
 
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court has stated that 
"the fact that [an] instruction was allegedly incorrect under 
state law is not a basis for habeas relief." Estelle v. McGuire, 
502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991); see also id. at 67 ("We have 
stated many times that federal habeas corpus r elief does 
not lie for errors of state law.") (quotations omitted). Rather, 
a habeas court must consider " `whether the ailing 
instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the 
resulting conviction violates due process,' . . . not merely 
whether `the instruction is undesirable, err oneous, or even 
universally condemned.' " Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 
145, 154 (1977) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 
146-47 (1973)). 
 
"The burden of demonstrating that an err oneous 
instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a 
collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state 
court's judgment is even greater than the showing required 
to establish plain error on direct appeal." Id. In determining 
whether the accomplice-liability charge at Duncan's trial 
satisfies this burden, we must remember the Supreme 
Court's insistence that "a single instruction to a jury may 
not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In its PCR opinion, the New Jersey Supr eme Court found Duncan's 
direct challenge to the defective jury instructions was barred because he 
had not raised the issue at trial or on direct appeal. The parties now 
dispute whether Duncan has exhausted this claim for purposes of his 
federal habeas petition. Because this claim is clearly without merit, we 
decline to address the parties' exhaustion ar guments. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(b)(2) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied 
on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the 
remedies available in the courts of the State."). 
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the context of the overall charge." Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146- 
47. 
 
A review of the instructions in this case does not support 
Duncan's contention that they "infected" his trial. In 
Bielkiewicz, upon which Duncan relies, the court reversed 
the defendants' murder conviction because the accomplice- 
liability instruction effectively precluded the jury from 
considering lesser offenses under an accomplice theory. The 
court was concerned that " `[w]here one of the elements of 
the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is 
plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its 
doubts in favor of conviction.' " 267 N.J. 534, 632 A.2d at 
285 (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 
(1973)) (emphasis in original). However, the context of the 
instruction in Bielkiewicz was very dif ferent than it was 
here. In Bielkiewicz, the co-defendants were tried jointly; 
the trial court did not inform the jury that the defendants 
could be convicted of the lesser manslaughter of fenses on 
an accomplice theory, and did not "even mention 
accomplice liability in instructing the jury with r espect to 
these lesser included offenses." 267 N.J. Super. at 531, 632 
A.2d at 283. 
 
By contrast, the trial court in Duncan's case began its 
instructions on the first count of Duncan's indictment with 
a very detailed charge describing the elements of purposeful 
or knowing murder, then continued by dir ecting the jury 
that if it did not find purpose or knowledge, it must 
consider the lesser included manslaughter of fenses which it 
described in detail. Only after instructing the jury on all 
counts of the indictment did the court refer to the State's 
complicity theory and give the jury its accomplice-liability 
instruction, which it in no way restricted to the murder 
charges. Therefore, the jury in this case was clearly told 
that it should consider the lesser manslaughter of fenses, 
like the murder charge, under both dir ect and accomplice 
theories of liability. 
 
We can understand the concern of the court in 
Bielkiewicz, where the co-defendants wer e tried jointly, that 
there could be some misunderstanding or some compulsion 
to treat both defendants alike. Here, adequate instructions 
were given and we have no reason to believe that the jury 
 
                                23 
  
did not understand that the accomplice-liability instruction 
could apply to either type offense. Nothing in the 
instructions prevented the jury from considering the lesser 
offenses under an accomplice theory of liability. At most, 
the fault that one might argue would be one of omission, 
which the Supreme Court has stated is less serious than a 
misstatement of the law. See Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155. 
("An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to 
be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law."). 
 
Therefore, we cannot hold that the absence of the specific 
instruction later required by Bielkiewicz, when viewed in 
the context of this case, so infected the trial with unfairness 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affir m the District 
Court's denial of Duncan's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                24 
 
